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The Fight for Legitimacy:
Liberal Democracy Versus Terrorism
by
Cindy R. Jebb
INTRODUCTION
Terrorism poses unique challenges to the liberal democratic state.  Namely,
terrorists target state legitimacy, therefore democratic states must carefully
choose their counter-terrorist strategies so as not to undermine their own values.
Comparative studies reveal that societies of liberal states must provide consen-
sus for those anti- and counter-terrorist policies adopted by the state.1 If liberal
democracies take police state-like action in response to terrorism, then arguably
the terrorists have achieved their ends.  This challenge requires close scrutiny of
political culture, which serves as a reflection of a society’s legitimacy for its
leaders and policies.  Moreover, the transnational nature of terrorism necessitates
cooperation between and among states to address the common threat of terror-
ism.  If societies must condone their states’ counter-terrorist policies, then those
societies of the cooperating states must reach a minimal level of consensus on
how to view justice, human rights, rule of law, civil liberties, etc; the operating
level of these traits in a society describes a society’s political culture.  
The Basque case will demonstrate the relevance of these theoretical con-
nections and examine how the combination of Spain’s adherence to democratic
principles during its transition and its cooperation with France facilitated Spain’s
democratic consolidation and mitigation of the Basque terrorist threat, while also
strengthening France’s liberal democratic principles.  Through cooperation, both
countries addressed the transnational terrorist problem, while securing the legit-
imacy of their liberal democratic orders.  In fact, Europe as a region benefitted
from this case because it helped pave the way for increased regional cooperation
on this issue and other transnational threats.  Such an examination requires an
interdisciplinary approach to the challenge of transnational threats to liberal
democracies.  The theoretical portion of this article will use international rela-
tions, security studies, and comparative politics to address the transnational
nature of the security environment; the basis of state legitimacy; terrorism as a
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transnational threat to liberal democracies; and the connection of political culture
and political community to a liberal democratic state’s legitimacy.  
The purpose of this study is to learn from our European allies.  According
to Bruce Hoffman:  “The changing face of terrorism will only diminish the divi-
sions between the United States and Europe, as governments on both sides of the
Atlantic strive to adapt to the challenges posed by transnational networks . . ..”
And “Given the prevailing patterns of globalization, the security, coordination,
and policy challenges facing Europe today are likely to spread to other countries
tomorrow . . ..  It is perhaps time for the United States to listen and learn rather
than to hector and push.”2 Moreover, with the newly formed EUROPOL, which
coordinates and supports member states’ law enforcement activities, with a char-
ter to combat terrorism and other transnational threats, there may be widespread
convergence of political cultures across Europe in the future.3 Admittedly, the
EU members’ economic integration  has affected political culture, and the sys-
tematic steps toward furthering political integration cannot help but have a pro-
found effect on the members’ political cultures.  As Europe’s primary ally, the
United States has many opportunities for cooperation, especially when dealing
with transnational threats, such as terrorism.  Cooperation will be essential to
address these threats, but it ought not be at the expense of American regime legit-
imacy.  A convergence of political cultures implies that the participants are all
making adjustments at the foundation of their regimes, namely recalculating their
legitimacy formula.4 This study will also shed light on the meaning and impli-
cation of the concepts of terrorism, liberal democracy, political culture, political
community, and legitimacy.  A better understanding of these terms may enhance
policy discourse and choices.   
THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
The challenge of terrorism to liberal democracies must be analyzed in a
strategic context.  This is not an easy task, and during the timeframe of the
Basque case the security environment was dominated by the superpower rivalry.
Forces that we are now just observing and analyzing in the post-Cold War era
were operating, albeit in the Cold War’s blind-spot.   For example, the forces of
globalization and localization shaped the situation in Spain and its relationship
with the Basque region, with France, and with the European Community (EC).
Moreover, globalization and localization influenced the democratization process
in post-Franco Spain.  The term, “globalization” is a frequently used term that is
cast in a variety of contexts, and, consequently, it has come to mean many dif-
ferent things, both positive and negative,  to many different people.  For our pur-
pose here, it is important to view globalization as a dynamic process that has
potential for both good and bad, democratic and non-democratic, and security-
enhancing and security-detracting.  In sum, it is a non-normative process.  James
Rosenau makes this point when he differentiates between globalism as a world
system that embraces universal values and globalization as a process that
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describes forces in every sphere of human and environmental activity that tran-
scends borders.  He further distinguishes between globalization and localization:
“In short, globalization is boundary-broadening and localization is boundary-
heightening.”  He describes the combination of these forces as “fragmegration.”5
Today, the US Commission on National Security/21st Century recognizes these
two forces:  “This Commission’s Phase I report pointed to two contradictory
trends ahead:  a tide of economic, technological, and intellectual forces that is
integrating a global community, amid powerful forces of social and political
fragmentation.”6
These forces are not necessarily contradictory.  The nation-state is not
withering away; rather, we are witnessing a sharing of powers both at the local
and supranational level.  The nation-state is still the most viable political entity,
and nations without states are still struggling in their quest for statehood.  Just
like post-1945 decolonization unleashed nationalism, the fall of the Soviet Union
and the post-Cold War aftermath unleashed another echelon of nationalist senti-
ment.7 However, with the end of bipolarity, feelings of irredentism, nationalism,
religion, and ethnicity stress the international system.  Bruce Hoffman claims
that these sentiments, not ideology, are fueling terrorism and forecasts that these
forces “. . . long held in check or kept dormant by the cold war may erupt to pro-
duce even greater levels of non-state violence . . ..”8 Consequently, the Basque
case may provide enduring lessons for like cases now and in the future.
Furthermore, while this article’s focus is the challenge of the transnational
nature of terrorism that the end of the Cold War has escalated, it is not the only
transnational threat we face.  The US 1999  National Security Strategy describes
transnational threats as:
. . . threats that do not respect national borders and which often arise
from non-state actors, such as terrorists and criminal organizations
. . ..  Examples include terrorism, drug trafficking and other interna-
tional crime, illicit arms trafficking, uncontrolled refugee migration,
and trafficking in human beings . . .. We also face threats to critical
infrastructures, which increasingly could take the form of a cyber-
attack in addition to physical attack or sabotage . . ..9
Moreover, with the increased number of weak states and transitioning states,
internal conflicts, regardless the cause, can quickly escalate regionally and pos-
sibly globally.  Michael Brown contends that internal conflicts matter because
they are widespread, cause much suffering, involve proximate states, and can
indirectly or directly influence the interests of international organizations and
“distant powers.”10 While the scope of this article is limited to terrorism, its sig-
nificance as a source for internal conflict and the escalating effects of such con-
flict, make critical study of terrorism even more a matter of national – and glob-
al – security.
The discussion above focuses on the threats and vulnerabilities associated
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with the forces of  “fragmegration.”  There are also opportunities in such an envi-
ronment.11 The coincidence and commonality of national and global interests
among states have fostered alliances, treaties, international organizations, and
international regimes as means for attaining or securing these interests.  For
example, the European Community offered member countries great advantages.
For Germany, it offered a means to gain sovereignty of the iron and steel
resources; a path back into the international system; and hope for possible reuni-
fication.  For France, the EC helped manage the “German problem,” while allow-
ing France to influence Europe.  The EC gave more voice to the smaller states,
such as the Benelux countries, vis-à-vis the larger European states; brought Spain
and Portugal back into the European family of nations; assisted with Italy’s eco-
nomic development; and offered Britain a powerful forum, which it could not
afford to ignore.  The integration of these member EC (now the European Union
[EU]), countries was supported by the idea that unification could prevent war.12
Other opportunities in the environment  include non-state actors, such as civil
society, non-governmental organizations, and individuals.  The security environ-
ment  of Western Europe during Spain’s democratic transition favored integra-
tion and cooperation, which helped mitigate the terrorist challenge it faced.  The
global security environment, through the forces of “fragmegration,” presents lib-
eral democracies with not only challenges, but also tools to manage and meet
these challenges, as well.   
TERRORISM
Before beginning a critical analysis of terrorism in the context described
above, we will carefully consider the myriad of definitions, categories and per-
ceptions of the term, terrorism.  As one would expect, there is no one right
answer.  Alex Schmid cautions that, “The question of definition of a term like ter-
rorism cannot be detached from the question of who is the defining agency.”13 It
is a subjective term, an important point to which we will return later in the arti-
cle.  According to Donald Hanle, “Terrorism is called terrorism because it vio-
lates the normative values of the target entity regarding the employment of lethal
force.”14 Philip B. Heymann illustrates the subjectivity of this term by review-
ing several countries’ definitions.  According to the Office for the Protection of
the Constitution, Germany’s internal security agency, terrorism is the, “endur-
ingly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved
by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by
means of severe crimes [such as murder, kidnapping, arson].”  Britain’s
“Prevention of Terrorism Act” of 1974 defines terrorism as “the use of violence
for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the
public or any section of the public in fear.”  The US State Department views ter-
rorism as any violent act conducted for political purposes by substate actors or
“secret state agents” against normally noncombatants with the goal of influenc-
ing an audience.  US law (18 U.S.C. 3077) defines a terrorist act as criminal vio-
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lence that “appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian popula-
tion; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.”  And,
according to a group of European interior ministers coordinating their efforts
concerning the challenges of terrorism, “Terrorism is . . . the use, or the threat-
ened use, by a cohesive group of persons of violence (short of warfare) to affect
political aims.”15
Heymann settles for a definition that seems to represent a common ground
for most definitions.  Consequently, he uses the following traits:  politically moti-
vated; conducted by groups, but not by individuals; acts are an integral part of a
bigger strategy; directed at noncombatants; and, “to preserve moral fervor,”
Heymann limits his use of terrorism “to political violence in or against true
democracies.”16 Heymann concludes that “terrorism  is an illegal form of clan-
destine warfare that is carried out by a sub-state group to change the policies,
personnel, structure, or ideology of a government, or to influence the actions of
another part of the population – one with enough self-identity to respond to selec-
tive violence.”17 As with all definitions of terrorism, Heymann’s definition rais-
es interesting questions such as:  should terrorism include states that terrorize
their own populations?  Should terrorism be limited in scope concerning only
democratic regimes?  For purposes of this study, we will rely heavily on
Heymann’s definition, while acknowledging that there is much debate on exact-
ly what terrorism is or is not.  
In sum, the above discussion suggests that terrorist activities have a polit-
ical purpose, and they are conducted outside normal political bounds, involving
symbolic violence usually perpetrated against innocent victims in order to weak-
en the bonds between the legitimate government and society.18 Consequently,
the complexities involved with understanding terrorism compel academics and
policy makers to view terrorism in a historical, social, and political context.19
DEMOCRATIZATION
Post-Franco Spain was a precursor to the post-Cold War’s third wave of
democratizing states and gives us a glimpse of the unique challenge liberal
democracies, especially transitioning states, face with combating terrorism.
States that are transitioning to democratic regimes are vulnerable to internal con-
flict that terrorists can exploit.  Essentially, these transitioning states are repli-
cating the early stages of state-making.  Different power centers are competing
for supremacy, which can easily erupt into conflict.  How do such states survive
these internal conflicts without de-legitimizing themselves as liberal democra-
cies?  Don Chull Shin emphasizes the fact that democratic regimes can only sur-
vive when their societies are committed to them; democratizing states have lim-
ited resources to facilitate the democratizing process; and, subsequently, this
process is marked by uncertainty.  Shin discusses the stages of democratization
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as the following:  decay of authoritarian rule; transition, marked by uncertainty
and a hybrid mix of democratic and authoritarian institutions; consolidation,
marked by elite consensus, mass participation, and most importantly, the devel-
opment of a democratic political culture; and, maturation or the consolidation of
democracy over time.20 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter under-
score the uncertainty found in the transitional stage:  “. . . democracy, then,
emerges from a nonlinear, highly uncertain, and imminently reversible process
involving the cautious definition of certain spaces and moves on a multilayered
board.”21 Francis Fukuyama claims that it is not the mere existence of demo-
cratic institutions that will secure the fate of transitioning democracies; rather, it
will be in the critical realms of civil society and culture that successful transitions
will be determined.22 In fact, a number of studies indicate that even with the rise
of electoral democracies, freedoms world-wide have decreased.  The connection
between democracy and liberty is not linear, and culture seems to be a critical
intervening variable.23 According to Larry Diamond, “. . . elections are only one
dimension of democracy.  The quality of democracy also depends on its levels of
freedom, pluralism, justice and accountability.”  He continues to explain liberal
democracy as having the following conditions:
Freedom of belief, expression, organization, demonstration, and
other civil liberties, including protection from political terror and
unjustified imprisonment; a rule of law under which all citizens are
treated equally and due process is secure; political independence and
neutrality of the judiciary and other institutions of ‘horizontal
accountability’ that check the abuse of power, such as electoral
administration, audits, and a central bank; an open and pluralistic
civil society, including not only associational life but the mass media
as well; and civilian control of the military.24
Democratic political culture fosters these traits of civil liberties, rule of
law, civil society, and civilian control of the military, all of which are necessary
to a liberal democracy.  The liberal qualifier for democratic regimes is so impor-
tant for the consolidation of these regimes that Samuel Huntington calls for poli-
cies that emphasize the liberalization of electoral democracies.  He recommends
greater cooperation and the development of a community among liberal democ-
racies, a community he suggests be called a Demintern (now that the Comintern
is gone!).25
Political culture is at the crux of this study because it is the target of ter-
rorists’ actions, it reflects a society’s legitimacy for its leaders and their policies
(in this case counter-terrorist policies), and it is an essential determining ingredi-
ent for moving transitioning regimes into a more stable consolidated phase.
Inherent in the concept of political culture is the idea of a political community
that describes a society’s loyalties toward the political system.  These concepts –
political culture, legitimacy, and political community – are intricately interwov-
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en, but because of their amorphous nature, they do not always receive the criti-
cal analysis necessary to understand political behavior.  Consequently, I will
address each of these foundational concepts and then fold them back together to
better understand how liberal democracies can best ward off threats that target
their inner souls.  This inner soul is the state’s legitimacy.  According to Max
Weber, “If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by
the powers that be.  When and why do men obey?  Upon what inner justifications
and upon what external means does this domination rest?”26 This inner justifi-
cation is a state’s legitimacy.  Ralf  Dahrendorf explains legitimacy and effec-
tiveness as two keys to a state’s stability.  He argues that for governments to
work:
. . . two things have to be present:  effectiveness and legitimacy.
Effectiveness is a technical concept.  It simply means that govern-
ments have to be able to do things which they claim they can do . . .
they have to work.  Legitimacy, on the other hand, is a moral con-
cept.  It means that what governments do has to be right . . .. A gov-
ernment is legitimate if what it does is right both in the sense of com-
plying with certain fundamental principles, and in that of being in
line with prevailing cultural values.27
Moreover, these two concepts are asymmetrically related.  Governments,
such as totalitarian regimes, may be effective without being legitimate.
However, “Over time, ineffectiveness will probably erode legitimacy.”28
Dahrendorf is most concerned about the erosion of legitimacy because for
democracies  “ . . . there is a great danger that the response to a crisis of legiti-
macy will be authoritarianism and illiberty.”29 Augustus Norton agrees that the
most important element for state survival is legitimacy, meaning “that authority
which rests on the shared cultural identity of ruler and ruled.”  States base legit-
imacy on a “political formula” which justifies a leader’s rule.
As Gaetano Mosca notes, political formulas are not ‘mere quack-
eries’ aptly invented to trick the masses into obedience . . ..  The truth
is that they answer a real need in man’s social nature; and this need,
so universally felt, of governing and knowing that one is governed
not on the basis of mere material or intellectual force, but on the
basis of moral principle, has . . . a practical and a real importance.  
When legitimacy dissolves, the regime is vulnerable to change.30 Timothy J.
Lomperis argues that “. . . a state can rule without legitimacy, but not well.”31
Ted Robert Gurr and Muriel McClelland stress the importance of societal atti-
tudes for legitimacy.  They define legitimacy as “the extent that a polity is regard-
ed by its members as worthy of support.  This is not the same as citizens’ com-
pliance with laws and directives, but refers to a basic attitude that disposes them
to comply in most circumstances . . ..”32
Along with this idea of an attitude toward the political system is the idea
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of a political community or identity.33 David Easton refers to the political com-
munity as a “domain of support” for the political system.34 Michael C. Hudson
links the idea of community with legitimacy: “If the population within given
political boundaries is so deeply divided within itself on ethnic or class lines . . .
then it is extremely difficult to develop a legitimate order.”35 Furthermore, this
“legitimate order requires a distinct sense of corporate selfhood:  the people
within a territory must feel a sense of political community . . ..”36
These ideas of a political community and attitude toward the political sys-
tem describe the concept of political culture.  In fact Robert Dahl’s work on polit-
ical opposition groups helped reveal political culture based on a society’s attitu-
dinal orientations toward problem solving, the political system, cooperation and
individuality, and people. Interestingly, even among democracies, political cul-
tures differ.  For example, citizens of Italy and France have been described as
having alienated or apathetic attitudes toward their political systems; West
German citizens exhibit detached attitudes; and citizens of the United States and
Great Britain tend to have an allegiant orientation toward their political sys-
tems.37 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, in their seminal work on civic cul-
ture, conclude:
In sum, the most striking characteristic of the civic culture . . . is its
mixed quality.  It is the mixture in the first place of parochial, sub-
ject, and citizen orientations . . ..  The result is a set of political ori-
entations that are managed or balanced.  There is political activity,
but not so much as to destroy governmental authority; there is
involvement and commitment, but they are moderated; there is polit-
ical cleavage, but it is held in check.  Above all, the political orien-
tations that make up the civic culture are closely related to general
social and interpersonal relationships, of general trust and confi-
dence in one’s social environment, penetrate political attitudes and
temper them.38
A civic culture, that is a democratic political culture, describes a culture in
which people feel that they make a difference politically; they tolerate others;
they trust their fellow citizen and political elites; and they have allegiance toward
the political system.39 I will use Almond’s definition of civic culture, Diamond’s
criteria for liberalism, and the idea of political community to assess the impact
of terrorism on political culture for the case below.  Consequently, I will exam-
ine institutions, attitudes, policies, and scholarly opinion that reflect shifts in the
political culture.  Specifically, this study of Spain will examine shifts in attitudes
at the elite level, that is evidence of elite consensus on democratic principles;
shifts in societal attitudes toward its members’ ability to affect the political sys-
tem; attitudes toward other members and groups in society; and societal attitudes
toward the political system and its policies.  Attitudes toward the terrorist group,
ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna or Basque Homeland and Freedom), will also be
Spring 2003
134
examined.  A liberal, democratic culture is the essence of democracy; it provides
legitimacy for the democratic regime, making it the terrorist’s bull’s-eye.
DEMOCRATIC COUNTER-TERRORISM (CT) PRINCIPLES
Mature democracies, while more stable than consolidated or transitioning
democracies, must still guard against challenges that threaten their legitimacy.
Consequently, they face similar legitimacy challenges when dealing with terror-
ism, and political culture stands out again.  While the definitions of terrorism
may differ, there seems to be a consensus concerning the imperative of society’s
support in its state’s counter- and anti-terrorist policies.  This consensus is impor-
tant on several levels.  First, mature, liberal democracies cannot undermine their
own values by imposing police state-like policies as a means of addressing ter-
rorism.  Grant Wardlaw warns that, “The danger lies in the possibility of doing
the terrorists’ job for them by taking unnecessary steps in an attempt to counter
the perceived threat and thereby fundamentally altering the nature of democra-
cy.”40 And in a comparative study, David Charters acknowledges that, “political
culture, more than any other factor, shaped – and continues to shape – democratic
responses to the challenge of . . . terrorism.”41
The underlying check for any organizing framework regarding CT policy
is its ability to protect a state’s population, while eliciting legitimacy.  Public
opinion and attitudes matter.  Policy should mitigate fear in society by employ-
ing “fear-reduction measures,” such as crisis management; reducing the “hype”
in the media; exposing the weaknesses and failures of terrorists, while empha-
sizing the successes against terrorist groups; and, ensuring institutional checks
and balances for both the executive and legislative branches through oversight
and enforcement procedures.42 Finally, the state must understand the differences
among terrorist groups; they are not all at the same level of threat, and these dis-
tinctions are important to avoid needless panic, while performing objective
analysis.43 These views can be expanded into the following CT principles for CT
policy in a democratic state.
1.  Real “. . . commitment to the rule of law.”44
Security authorities must have full  governmental support, but they must
also understand and adhere to the rule of law and know that any extra-legal
actions would be punished.  The issue of balance is important.  States that have
experienced the effects of terrorism may be more inclined to adopt anti-terror
legislation than states that have not experienced a sustained or high degree of ter-
rorism.  The government must demonstrate that it can protect its citizens, and if
the existing laws are widely viewed as ineffective, then the government may
craft more restrictive policies.  However, these policies must be accepted as legit-
imate.45 The same type of considerations must be made for the use of anti-terror
assault teams and covert intelligence gathering.  The militarization  of a police
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force can only occur if society views its creation as necessary, for an identifiable
purpose, and as a last resort used under very controlled conditions.46 And for
intelligence gathering, the state must balance the critical importance of intelli-
gence to secure its populations against terrorists, while safeguarding individual
freedoms and liberties. Subsequently, intelligence services must ensure that there
is a specific mandate for its operations, are within legal bounds, and monitor only
those individuals who the state has reason to believe are engaged in serious crim-
inal activities.47 The same judgment must be made about the media.  States’ poli-
cies represent the full spectrum from allowing media access to terrorist sympa-
thizers to relying on self-imposed restrictions to government-imposed restric-
tions.48 The balance between security and liberty must be struck, but with soci-
etal support. 
2.  Each state must define terrorism.  
As the definition becomes all inclusive, so does the potential for over-reac-
tion; “. . . terrorism must be countered in a discriminating, case-by-case man-
ner.”49 Understanding the context of terrorism allows for a better integration of
a state’s elements of power to deal with the terrorist challenge.  Ian Lesser
explains that “. . . political violence, including terrorism, has systemic origins
that can be ameliorated.”50 Both “diplomacy and the use of force can contribute
both to the containment and the eventual resolution of such [ethnic and national-
ist] conflicts . . ..”51
3.  A state’s CT policies’ credibility relies on the close correlation between
words and actions.
The state must demonstrate resolve and avoid making empty threats.  If the
government fails to elicit confidence that it will protect its citizens, then vigilante
CT groups may arise, which undermines the rule of law and can trigger a regime
crisis.52
4.  A state must work to lower expectations for a total victory.  
There are too many factors that cannot be controlled, and as a result CT
strategies will fall somewhere between what’s desirable and what’s feasible.
This spectrum allows for a range of options for the government short of an all-
out crusade that can go way off track.  Society must realize that the measure of
success is short of total victory.53
5.  Collaboration between and among states and within a state’s intelli-
gence agencies is  increasingly important.  
Bruce Hoffman emphasizes the criticality of foreign collaboration, espe-
cially between states that share a border that terrorists exploit.54 Philipe B.
Heymann states that “intelligence gathering is the most important form of pre-
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vention of terrorism.55 Again, the guiding principle is one of balance described
in the preceding principles.
As explained earlier, this study will measure societal and elite attitudes
toward the political system; institutional changes that reflect shifts in political
culture across the population; attitudes towards ETA; and, finally attitudes
toward the CT policies and political efforts aimed at eliciting legitimacy.   As the
preceding CT principles indicate, legitimacy for CT policy in a democratic state
is essential.  That legitimacy is a product of political culture and effectiveness of
the policy.  This equation becomes more challenging to solve for states that are
democratizing and are facing societal and political legitimacy issues that are
indeed sources, albeit not justifications, for terrorist activity. 
BACKGROUND TO SPAIN, THE BASQUES, AND ETA 1975-1992
This case reflects the security environment trends discussed above.  A
democratizing state, Spain, and its eventual partner, France, a mature democra-
cy, together faced the challenge of transnational terrorism.  Moreover, the time-
frame includes Spain’s transition and consolidation of democracy.56 The
Basques and the EU demonstrate the forces of “fragmegration.”  More impor-
tantly, the case reveals the impact of cooperation on Spain and France’s political
cultures as they worked together to manage their common terrorist threat.  By
examining this regional case, we may discover insights that will help other states,
including the United States, combat terrorism. 
Spain is an interesting case because it was the first country to democratize
in Huntington’s “third wave.”  It was a “regime-initiated transition;” the author-
itarian regime did not suffer a defeat per say.  Moreover, the problems and issues
of a multi-lingual and multi-national state came to the fore during the regime’s
transition.57 For the purpose of this article, Spain is unique because as Howard
Wiarda claims, “Perhaps in no other country in the world has the culture . . . the
political culture, changed as dramatically in so short a time – during the 1960s
and 1970s – as in Spain.  In that period Spain went from being a fundamentally
conservative, traditional, and exceedingly Catholic society to being liberal, radi-
cal, innovative, and secular . . ..”58 In this context, Spain had to legitimize its
transitional democracy in order to consolidate and stabilize its democratic, polit-
ical regime.  The story of the Basques, therefore must be told in this democra-
tizing context.
The Basque Separatist and ETA Challenge
Three themes emerge that have historically affected Spain’s political
development.  First, Spain has had to deal with tension between the central
authority and regional areas.  Geography reinforced regional and tribal isolation
and the authority of the local caudillos vis-à-vis the state.  Second, there has been
conflict between the state and the robust corporate life, consisting of the military,
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religious fraternities, guilds, towns, etc.  Third, there’s been an ideological split
between advocates of tradition and faith versus those of liberalism.  This split
manifested itself in the Spanish Civil War, from which Franco emerged and con-
solidated power at the state level.  Additionally, change has been an on-going
process for Spain.  It experienced industrialization during the last decades of the
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century with a reactionary
monarch in power.  Spain even experienced some political participation during
its First Republic in 1931-36.  Franco’s emergence after the Spanish Civil War
rolled back many of these advances; however, during the 1960s and 1970s,
Franco did allow for some opening in the economic, political, and social realms.
This opening characterized the change of his regime from a Dictadure (hard dic-
tatorship) to a Dictablanda (soft dictatorship).59
While there was some openness, Franco’s goal was to restore Spain’s
authenticity.  He sought to instill values that reflected conservatism, tradition,
Catholicism, anti-communism, and obedience.  Public opinion polls in the 1960s
reflected these values, suggesting that Franco was somewhat successful.60
Additionally, he set out to modernize the country by increasing industrial pro-
duction in the established, industrial Basque and Catalan regions.  He diverted
the gains made in these areas to the lesser industrialized areas of the south.  This
strategy had devastating effects on the Basques.  First, with increased industrial-
ization, many non-Basques fled to the area for jobs thus competing with the
Basques.  Second, needed resources to deal with the public effects of industrial-
ization were nonexistent since the resources were diverted elsewhere.61
The story of the Basques and the Spanish state has been a long, contentious
one.  The Basques were on the losing side of the civil war, and Franco was deter-
mined to create “a single personality, Spanish.”  Consequently, the Franco
regime dealt with the Basques in a repressive manner, forbidding any outward
expression of Basque culture and political identity.  In response, the Basques
formed a ‘we-they’ identity between themselves and the Spanish, viewing the
Spanish as an occupying foreign force.62
This inability to express cultural or political aspirations through legitimate
means created a growing sense of discontent and disenfranchisement among the
younger Basque nationalists.  From 1956 and 1975, Franco declared 12 states of
exception in which five were directed against all of Spain and six were directed
only against the Basque region.  Approximately, 8,500 Basques were directly
affected by either arrests, imprisonment, torture, or fleeing the state.  The ETA
was founded in 1959 in response to Franco’s repression, having the goals of
Basque independence and maintaining Basque cultural integrity.63
The ETA began as and continues to be a transnational terrorist organiza-
tion; Basques live on both sides of the French-Spanish border, which has been a
hard border to control.  France helped legitimize the ETA’s activities by offering
sanctuary.  Additionally, the ETA has coordinated such activities as training and
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arms supplies with other terrorist organizations in Europe and the Third World,
and it has adopted foreign frameworks to assist with legitimizing its activities
and developing strategies.  Specifically, ETA members have received training in
Yemen, Libya, and Algeria, with the Middle East supplying arms and Libya pro-
viding funds.  Other European terrorist groups have coordinated the purchase of
weapons from Communist Czechoslovakia and the former Soviet Union, and
close continuous ties were established with the IRA.  Finally, the ETA have
adopted anti-colonial ideological views and insurgent strategies from many ter-
rorist groups from the Third World.64
The unique regional dialect, Euskera, provided a source for identity of the
ETA’s nationalist aspirations.  Many of the rural areas spoke the dialect by the
end of the ninettenth century, but Basques embraced it as a means of preserving
cultural identity.  General Franco forbade the dialect because it detracted from
centralism and unity, the basis of his Fascist Falange goal.  Initially, the ETA did
not call for a terrorist strategy or insurgency, although it did not share the PNV’s
(Partido Nacionalista Vasco – the recognized nationalist party) goals at the time.
With Franco’s continued brutality against the Basque region and culture, and the
influence of the Third World’s anti-colonial struggles, the ETA opened its terror-
ist campaign in 1968.65 The ETA violence did not cause the transition, but it did
put pressure on the Franco regime.  Franco responded through severe repression,
which tended to further de-legitimize Franco.66
Franco’s death did not stem ETA’s activities.  The main challenge the ETA
posed was its ability to provoke perceived, harsh police state-like responses from
Spain during its fragile democratic transition period.  Critics of Spain’s regime
point to its alleged torture of ETA members and the regime’s support of right-
wing counter-terrorist groups.  These harsh responses were infrequent, and they
did not represent main-stream policy of the transitional regime.67 Also, the state
did not officially sanction any state-sponsorship for counter-terrorist activities.
The purpose of the ETA in the post-Franco period remained the same:  de-legit-
imize the regime, mobilize public support, and Basque independence.  The ETA
targeted six audiences:  the Spanish public at-large with the aim of furthering
polarization; the Basque public with the goal of eliciting nationalist sentiment;
the Spanish military, which the ETA wanted to put at odds with the state; the
Spanish state, which the ETA wanted to de-legitimize by eliciting repressive
reactions; ETA members, with the aim of sustaining solidarity; and the Basque
government, which the ETA viewed as traitorous, but ironically, wanted its sup-
port.68
During this transition opinions about the institutional nature of the state
wavered.  With national focus on issues of regional autonomy versus independ-
ence, Spanish public opinion changed from 1977 with 45 percent supporting
regional autonomy to 1979 with 56 percent in favor of autonomy.  The Basque
opinion in 1977 was 63 percent supporting autonomy and 16 percent supporting
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independence, and in 1979 (with the constitution ratified), 20 percent supported
independence and 54 percent favoring autonomy.  Interestingly, the Spanish pop-
ulation’s supportive opinion of autonomy increased, while Basque opinion
reflected more polarization.  Overall, in 1979, the Basque population did not
reach consensus on its future regional status, but more importantly, the Spanish
population rejected any move toward state repression or conciliation in response
to ETA’s violent activities.  The Spanish people wanted rule of law to guide the
regime’s transition and CT policy. Interestingly, the Basque opinions were divid-
ed as reflected in the multiple parties (namely PNV, and Euzkadiko Ezkerra –
EE) that represented the Basque region.69 The EE represented most of the
Basque Left, although there were many splits among the Left.  The main issues
that separated the Left from the PNV included the amount of Basque and Spanish
party cooperation; the amount of territory that ought to be included in the Basque
autonomous region (the extreme Left wanted to include, for example, the French
Basque region); the relationship between the Basque autonomous region and the
central government; and, finally, the degree of free market versus nationalization
of industries.70
Moreover, there were schisms within the leading party, the PNV, that
reflected its desire to gain support among the diverse opinions of the Basques.
Consequently, the PNV had an ambiguous platform that reflected its desire to
strengthen its power within the state system but to also represent Basque nation-
alist sentiment.  One PNV elite remarked that the party’s goal was “to reunify the
Basque provinces so that we can join our brothers in France.”71 One Basque
Socialist leader explained PNV’s situation:  The PNV “cannot dare to condemn
the convent [ETA] because they are orthodox; it cannot renounce posibilismo
because that is salvation.  As a consequence, its ambiguity persists; ambiguity in
its behavior, ambiguity in its words, and in its strategy . . ..  It wants at one and
the same time to be with the constitution and with ETA.”72 The PNV Basque
government did not publicly condemn ETA violence until 1985, which followed
ETA violence against PNV officials.73 Shabad and Ramo make an insightful
observation, which is that moderate parties may manipulate extremist or violent
terrorist groups to strengthen their own bargaining power with the state.74 The
Basque province itself was wracked with ambiguity and polarization.  In 1983,
one former Socialist leader remarked:  “Something paradoxical has occurred in
the Basque Country.  In these moments, it is the corner of Spain that is most
remote from democratic principles practiced in Europe . . ..  It is the corner in
which intolerance, fanaticism, and violence are most entrenched.  They are the
ones who represent the old Spaniard . . . the intolerant Spaniard, fanatic.75
This transition period was very vulnerable to instability, and the ETA took
advantage of this opportunity.  Between 1960 and 1975, when Franco died, the
ETA caused 43 deaths.  During 1978, the year in which the constitution was
approved, the ETA caused 65 deaths; in 1979, the total number rose to 78, and in
1980, the year of the first regional elections, the total reached 96.  Also, the tran-
Spring 2003
140
sition period saw the first killings of military officers as a result of Basque ter-
rorist activities.76 Remarkably, the transitional regime was not blamed for these
acts because of the legitimizing steps it took during the democratization process.
First, state-wide parties campaigned in the Basque and Catalan regions and four
of them captured 51.4 percent of the Basque vote.  Second, the government
devolved power to the regions of Catalan and Basque.  Linz and Stepan argue
that by establishing state-wide elections before regional level elections, Spain
defused the Basque nationalist fervor.  Regional politicians were able to work
with legitimate state-wide politicians, which strengthened their relationships.
Moreover, this fostered multiple, regional, and state identities that were support-
ive of democracy.77
The Spanish Regime’s CT Policies
As previously mentioned, the Franco government’s response to ETA was
repression.  For example, the Franco regime considered military crimes to
include distribution of information designed to cause public disturbances, inter-
national conflict, or a loss of prestige for the state and its regime components.
Persons accused were tried by a military tribunal.  In 1969, of the 1,100 cases
heard by military tribunals, 80 percent involved activities that would not have
been crimes under a democratic system, such as distributing literature, partici-
pating in demonstrations, and other forms of political dissent. During the final
years under Franco, protections guaranteed by the constitution were completely
set aside as a State of Exception.  Amnesty International reported the regime’s
use of torture as a way to obtain information and instill fear in the Basque popu-
lation.  Franco approached the ETA and Basque separatist challenge in a military
manner, dividing Spain into military regions.78
The post-Franco regime quickly abolished the tribunals, ensured all politi-
cally-related crimes came under civilian jurisdiction, and abolished almost all
internal security policies created under Franco.  In 1977, the parliament approved
amnesty for political prisoners.  However, because ETA’s activities continued,
the parliament approved an anti-terrorist law, which ironically did not stem
ETA’s violence.  After a coup attempt in 1981, the state established the Law for
the Defense of the Constitution.  This law defined terrorism  as an attack on the
Spanish nation or an effort to create an independent region within the Spanish
state.  This law now included support for terrorist organizations, allowed for gov-
ernment censorship of the media, and resulted in fewer prison releases.79
As an example, however, of a democratic state requiring the consent of its
public for CT policy, the Interior Minister’s plan, “Plan Zen,” for further securi-
ty in the Basque region was rejected by the Basque parliament in 1983; conse-
quently, Madrid dropped it.  But the Spanish state established the new Organic
Law 8 in 1984, which gave increasingly more power to judges, allowing them to
order detention, up to two and one-half years, without trial for suspected terror-
ists.  Other powers included the banning of parties, shutting down media that
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supported terrorism, and prosecuting elected officials who criticized the govern-
ment and its symbols.80 Since 1984, however, there have been modifications to
this law stemming from political and social calls for protections of civil liber-
ties.81
By 1987, the Spanish Parliament passed an antiterrorist pact that banned
political contact between signatories of the pact and any organization that failed
to condemn ETA.  In 1988, the Basque Parliament approved a corresponding
pact, as well.  By 1989, ETA and the Spanish government began to engage in
talks, but by 1990, there appeared to be only a stalemate status.82
Spain has intentionally avoided militarizing the fight against ETA, and has,
therefore, not committed its Army.  Instead, the Ministry of the Interior directs
the fight using the following forces:  Guardia Civil, a para-military force, respon-
sible for areas and towns of less that 20,000 in population; Cuerpo Policia
Nacional, comprised of a Secret Police and a Uniformed Police, which acts as a
paramilitary force; Policia Municipal, uniformed police responsible for cities
over 20,000 in population; and, two operational police forces, the GEO, respon-
sible for special CT operations, and GAR, the CT Civil Guard for rural areas.
The Basque police force ensures public order within the Basque provinces and
answer to Basque authorities.83
As mentioned earlier, there have been reports that government support was
extended to the “Anti Terrorist Liberation Group” (GAL), a right-wing, anti-ETA
counter-terrorist group.  This group conducted its activities in the mid-1980s and
was responsible for 27 deaths.  Most of their activities took place in southern
France, with the goal of changing France’s policy of allowing sanctuary for ETA
members.  While the state never officially sanctioned GAL, its links to govern-
mental officials, including members of the police, top officials in Spain’s CT
units, and high officials within the Interior Ministry, resulted in prosecution and
imprisonment.  While the short-term effects of GAL’s actions disrupted ETA, the
longer-term effects were detrimental to the government’s anti-terrorist policies
because it could not achieve political consensus.  In fact, Fernando Reineres and
Oscar Jaime-Jimenez, conclude that, “Indeed, state-sponsored terrorism used to
counter insurgent terrorism can be considered a major factor explaining why
ETA has persisted beyond the democratic transition.”84
Fernando Jiminez observes that among the strengths of Spain’s CT policy’s
were the government’s and security forces’ resolve, adherence to the rule of law,
granting of Basque autonomy, and ensuring that the CT security forces were ded-
icated, disciplined, and professional.  He also lists some weaknesses:  lack of a
“centrally directed and coordinated intelligence organization”; weaknesses in
intelligence resources, gaps in specialized training, and others.85 While the fight
against ETA continues, two key pillars of Spain’s CT policy has been its cooper-
ation with France and its continued democratization.  Both pillars bolstered
Spain’s effectiveness and legitimacy and are detailed in the following sections.
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COOPERATION:  FRANCE AND SPAIN
Spain needed France’s help to effectively protect Spanish society from ter-
rorist attacks, but French cooperation did not come easily.   Since 1927, French
law protected asylum seekers.  While this law favored human rights, it was vul-
nerable to exploitation by extremist groups who based their activities in France,
but caused violence elsewhere.  It was a law that was abused by the French gov-
ernment, which used the law for political effect, that is as a means to express
opposition to a particular government or to make political statements.  Refusal of
extradition requests were based on and abused for the same reasons.  The histo-
ry of French politics has influenced the way the French view terrorism.  The
French Revolution was born from it, and through the years French leaders, citi-
zens, and institutions have engaged in terrorism.  There is an ambivalence in
French counter-terrorist policies that reflects the French experience.  President
Giscard D’Estaing’s statement in 1980 reflects this ambivalence: on the one hand
he stated,   “France must and will remain a land of the asylum,” and on the other
“France will not allow its soil to become a base for foreigners seeking to organ-
ize violent actions here.”86
The most serious case of France’s lenient attitude toward such groups was
its relationship with the ETA.  France opposed the Franco regime, and conse-
quently, allowed the ETA freedom of movement within France.87 Two events in
1973 influenced French policy.  First, the emergence of ETA’s French counter-
part, Iparretarak, and second, ETA’s assassination of the Spanish prime minister.
The French counterpart of ETA was Iparretarak, which formed in 1973.   Its goal
was also Basque independence.  Violence erupted when Iparretarak conflicted
with ETA, and ETA struck a deal with the French police in 1981.  In return for
French toleration, ETA promised not to commit violence on French soil.  As a
result, Iparretarak lost legitimacy in its struggle for Basque independence, and
by 1988, Iparretarak was defunct.88 In the latter case, the perpetrators fled to
France and held a press conference claiming responsibility.  France arrested the
assassins in 1974, renounced ETA as an organization and banned separatist
groups.  However, it was not until Franco’s death in 1975, that France made more
deliberate efforts against ETA activity on its soil.89
In 1976, France placed harsher restrictions on attaining work and residen-
tial status and work permits.  France conducted searches without warrants, sur-
veillance, and harassment of ETA members, and in 1977, France began a policy
of preventive detention.  In January of that year, France sent seven Spanish
Basques to Spain.  Still France refused extradition of any ETA members.  By the
end of the decade, however, France was experiencing its own Basque separatist
problem with unofficial Spanish anti-Basque activities causing much violence in
France.  France learned that providing sanctuary to terrorists was dangerous.90
Moreover, it was becoming politically difficult to justify sanctuary.  In June
1978, French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing admitted that the democratiza-
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tion of Spain required France to reevaluate  its policy concerning Spanish exiles.
They no longer could be viewed as political refugees, and therefore, would not
receive special privileges.91
However, France still clung to the view that terrorists were freedom fight-
ers.  In 1981, a French court ruled in favor of Tomas Linaza’s extradition who
was wanted in Spain for murdering six civil guards.  However the political
authorities overturned the court’s decision when Gaston Defferre, the interior
minister, ruled against extradition of any ETA members and compared their
activities to the French resistance.92 Nevertheless, during the 1980s public opin-
ion concerning France’s toleration of extremism changed.  The election of a
Socialist President for the first time in the Fifth Republic in 1981 and again, in
1988, with a socialist majority in parliament from 1981-86, reflected a shift of
allegiances that moved from the extreme to the center.  However, the government
of 1981 still took a firm position concerning extradition toward the ETA and
Spain continued to insist that France change its asylum and extradition policies.93
In 1982, the French government reviewed its extradition and asylum poli-
cies, and by 1984, there was a change, especially when France realized that it
would be blamed if Spain’s transitional democracy failed.  Also, Spain had a pol-
icy of reconciliation, not retribution toward ETA members living in France.  As
a result, France and Spain signed an anti-terrorist cooperation agreement, with
Gaston Defferre claiming that  “A terrorist is not a political refugee.”94 This
agreement, which began France’s cooperation over extradition requests and asy-
lum denials with respect to the Basque situation, had far-reaching consequences
for other groups.  France was no longer the guarantor of sanctuary.95 The French
began expelling Basque refugees in 1986, and in November they conducted a
raid on a factory in Hendaye, France, which they believed to be a cover for ETA’s
headquarters.  The French raid uncovered valuable organizational and opera-
tional intelligence on ETA and more arrests resulted.96
Subsequently, France recognized the need to cooperate with other states
and regional organizations to better address terrorism.  It agreed to ratify the
European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, and it broadened its cooper-
ative efforts with other European countries.  In May 1987, France hosted an
EC/Summit Seven conference of interior and justice ministers, where its interior
minister claimed “a willingness to take all the measures necessary” to better
international cooperation against terrorism.97 In fact, since 1987, France has
been handing over ETA members to the Spanish authorities without extradition
requests.98
Democratic Transition and the Development of Political Culture
Spain had some facilitating conditions that helped it through its transition
to democracy.  First, its cultural, economic, and social institutions resembled
those of Europe.  Spain’s economy was doing well, ranked 10th among capital-
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ist countries, world-wide.  Although its economy weakened during the transition,
it did not adversely affect the people’s support of the political regime.  Civil soci-
ety was in place, and Spain had established rule of law.  The international envi-
ronment played a role as well.   Adolfo Suarez had submitted Spain’s request for
EEC membership in 1977, and he received full backing from the parliament.
Although Spain did not become a member of the EEC until 1986, the member-
ship incentives enhanced Spain’s democratic transition and subsequent consoli-
dation.  The EEC lent credibility to democracy, and its members were very sup-
portive of Spain’s democratization.99
Given this situation, Spain successfully transitioned.  Juan Linz and Alfred
Stepan give a great deal of credit to the leadership of Suarez as a critical factor
in Spain’s democratization.  Suarez convinced the Cortes (legislature) to sanction
new elections, which ultimately meant that its members would be voted out of
office.  Consequently, the Cortes passed the Law for Political Reform and the
people, through a referendum, approved it on 15 December 1978.  Suarez
exploited this opportunity to make in-roads with opposition party members, and
he began the process of creating an inclusive political regime.  Political reform
was the first step; economic reform would follow.  According to Suarez, “As long
as political unknowns [incognitas] hang over the country, there cannot be either
economic reactivation or stability.”100
Robert Hislop described the impact of Suarez’s inclusive steps during the
transition:  “When minority elites are invited into the political process and regu-
larly interact with elites from the dominant group, common norms and values can
be discovered, friendships forged, and hostile stereotypes dispelled . . ..
Inclusion, voice, and routinized patterns of interaction give minority groups a
sense of having a stake in the system.”101 The political leadership was deter-
mined to undo Franco’s harsh cultural hegemonic policies.  To reflect this goal,
it invited moderate Basque and Catalan representatives to serve on the initial
committee that guided the transition immediately following Franco’s death.
Moreover, the 1978 constitution recognized Spain as a multi-cultural entity and
authorized the devolution of power to regional governments.  Suarez, however,
excluded the Basque representatives from the constitutional negotiations, and the
Basques nationalists called for “no” votes or abstentions during the ratification
process.  Suarez did not make the same mistake in 1979; he wanted consensus
on the autonomy statute.  He gained support from the head of the PNV through
private meetings.  By 1985, electoral imperatives caused a coalition between the
PNV and the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Party).  The PNV, as a result of this coali-
tion, publicly and strongly supported the constitution and denounced terrorism.
The Basque Left (EE) also publicly supported the state and renounced terrorism.
Only the Herri Batasuna (HB) remained steadfast in its commitment to Basque
independence and support of terrorism.  Consequently, the PNV and EE elites
were integrated into the political system, while HB and ETA were increasingly
isolated.102
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Unfortunately, the Spanish government had not been able to completely
eradicate the ETA’s terrorism, but due to Spain’s political legitimacy, the ETA did
not threaten the regime.  The attitudes of the Basques toward the ETA have
changed over time.  In 1979, 5 percent viewed the members of ETA as criminals
and 17.1 percent viewed them as patriots; in 1989, 16 percent considered them
criminals, and 5 percent saw them as patriots.  Other surveys indicate that 8 per-
cent fully supported the ETA in 1981, but in 1989 that figure dropped to 3 per-
cent.  Finally, in 1981, 23 percent totally rejected the ETA and 48 percent
responded with “don’t know, no answer” and in 1989, 45 percent totally reject-
ed the ETA, while 16 percent responded with “don’t know, no answer.”  Even
among the party respondents, surveys reflect a diminished support for the ETA.
Responses concerning ETA members as patriots from voters of the main nation-
alist party, PNV, reflect a drop of 40 percent in 1981 to 16 percent in 1989.  A
similar drop occurs among voters of the Herri Batasuna party.103 A 1986 survey
asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement:  “That
Violence is not Necessary to Achieve Political Goals . . ..”  Only the most radi-
cal Basque Party disagreed with 12 percent.  Spain’s political parties, including
the PNV and EE, overwhelmingly either very much agreed or somewhat agreed.
Even the response, “somewhat disagree” occurred in the single digit percentages,
except for HB, which had a 28 percent response.104 The ETA’s violent activities
did not have widespread support; it failed politically.
Moreover, 10 years after Franco’s death, people responded positively to the
democratic regime.  Seventy-six percent of the population expressed pride in the
regime, and only 9 percent responded negatively.  Additionally, public opinion
felt strongly about the regime through the 1980s.  Eighty-one percent agreed to
the statement:  “Democracy is the Best Political System for a Country Like
Ours.”105 In a 1986 survey, 8 out of 10 Basques rejected violence and had posi-
tive sentiment for Spain’s democratic system.106
Howard Wiarda concludes that Spain has become more “Europeanized.”
He claims that attitudes reflecting less affiliation with the Catholic Church,
strong support for democracy, more emphasis on merit than family or personal
ties as a means of social mobility, consumerism and materialism, changing gen-
der roles, and finally political moderation and apathy describe a shift toward a
civic culture.  He hastens to add that Spain has not fully Europeanized, but it has
made great strides.107
Analysis
An analysis of the Basque case highlights the challenge terrorism poses to
transitioning democracies.  The ETA increased its activities during the transition,
with the goal of taking advantage of a vulnerable regime.  It was a legitimate
organization during the Franco years of repression.  However, institutional steps
taken during the transition bolstered the regime’s legitimacy vis-à-vis the ETA.
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As the previous section demonstrated, however, the transition was not a smooth
process.  Violence increased, and there was significant Basque nationalist senti-
ment.  Suarez’s inclusive regime-building strategy and the multi-party structure
allowed for divergent views to be heard within the political system.  Basque
leaders, parties, and people began to have a stake in the democratic system.  The
autonomy statute sent a strong signal that cultural diversity was sanctioned by
the state.  Regional governments derived legitimacy not only from the regional,
political community, but also from the state through the autonomy statute.
Moreover, as Linz and Stepan argue, the transition sequence, namely having
state-wide elections prior to regional elections, de-legitimized the ETA and fos-
tered the Basques’ acceptance of multiple identities – Basque and Spanish.108
The regime, through institutions, was able to elicit loyalties at the state and
regional levels, thus fostering a state and regional, political community.  
It was not just the institutions that played a role, but the attitudes of the
Spanish and Basque populations were instrumental as well.  The Spanish popu-
lation did not support repressive measures against the Basque, even during the
tense transitional period.  Regime restraint bolstered its legitimacy.  As the tran-
sition continued through the consolidation phase, there was a noticeable decline
of support by both Basques and Spaniards in general for the ETA and its violent
tactics.  These sentiments reflect more tolerance, trust, and consensus among the
population.  The parties reflected diverse views that were integrated into the
political system.  Additionally, there was a state-wide referendum on the consti-
tution.  The people, in my view, felt that politically they made a difference.
There were still cleavages, but as Almond, Verba, and Diamond observed, civic
cultures have some polarization.
Not only did the transitioning regime recognize and address real griev-
ances among the Basques, it also recognized the importance of eliciting public
consensus for its CT policies.  Spain used the rule of law as a guide, and when
necessary introduced anti-terror laws that enhanced the state’s CT effectiveness.
Spain demonstrated resolve vis-à-vis ETA’s violence, while adhering to demo-
cratic principles, even when the ETA’s violence peaked.  When Spain wavered or
appeared to waver from rule of law, i.e. the GAL, it paid a price in terms of its
legitimacy, and unfortunately, may have bolstered the ETA’s legitimacy.
Moreover, Spain’s array of forces and the deliberate non-use of military forces
allowed for a myriad of options, within a legal paradigm as opposed to a war par-
adigm.  Finally, Spain could only effectively address the transnational threat of
ETA through cooperation with France.  
What does this case reveal about terrorism?  It is a dangerous phenomenon
during a regime’s transition period.  However, Spain, through its democratizing
efforts, was able to contain the effects of ETA’s violent activities.  In short, Spain
won the fight over legitimacy because the population developed allegiance to the
regime, not to the ETA.  This case shows that terrorism must be viewed in a polit-
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ical context.  The ETA presented no threat to the regime, even while violent acts
increased, because it never established legitimacy among the people.  Should ter-
rorism be considered in only a democratic context?  In other words, was the ETA
a freedom-fighting or a terrorist organization during the Franco regime?  The
ETA had more legitimacy during the Franco years when the regime offered no
alternatives for political expression.  Perhaps, over time, the ETA might have
won the legitimacy fight over Franco.  I am hesitant, however, to define terror-
ism in only a democratic context as Philip Heymann does.  If we include a dem-
ocratic context as part of the definition, then it is important to further define
democracy in terms of a developed civic culture.  Other interesting questions
include: should terrorism be viewed as a crime or an act of war.  Or perhaps
there’s a spectrum between crime and war?109 Spain’s use of specialized forces
and the balance it struck between civil liberties and security, may be an example
of a third paradigm short of war.  When should terrorism be viewed as a crime,
war, or something else?  The answer, I believe, is found in the earlier mentioned
principles of CT, namely that it must be viewed in context, defined, and coun-
tered in a case-by-case manner.  For Spain, it was able to contain and marginal-
ize the ETA.  If, however, the ETA evoked sufficient support among the popula-
tion to de-legitimize the Spanish regime, then Spain may have re-evaluated the
threat and declared war.
Larry Diamond claimed that liberal democracies must be able to protect
their societies from political terror.  France realized that it could no longer iso-
late itself from international terrorism; terror had come to its borders.  Both Spain
and France required each other’s cooperation.  The French elite’s and people’s
view toward justice as it relates to terrorism changed and were reflected in the
new asylum and extradition laws that Spain requested.  In fact, France has always
had to wrestle with its competing views of terrorism, but it had to converge with
Spain’s view in order to cooperate effectively.  France felt pressured to work with
a democratizing Spain.  Shabad and Ramo claimed that the establishment of the
Spanish constitution in 1978, the statutory recognition of the Basque
autonomous region, and Spain’s entry into the EC, contributed to France’s
stricter policies against the ETA.110 France certainly did not want responsibility
for Spanish democratic failure because of its refusal to extradite ETA members,
while offering them sanctuary.  When Spain took a conciliatory policy concern-
ing reconciliation towards ETA members, France could not justify its non-extra-
dition and lenient asylum laws.  Moreover, the government was responsive to the
people’s changed attitudes as reflected in the elections. Consequently, France
made some institutional changes through its asylum and extradition laws, and it
has continued to cooperate in different forums. 
While Spain’s political culture made much greater shifts toward the estab-
lishment of a civic culture, France, as a mature democracy, also experienced
shifts in attitudes.  However, French political culture is difficult to assess.  It does
not have consensus on many issues, as reflected by its several regime changes.
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Consequently, its counter-terrorist policies seem ambivalent.  Nevertheless,
increased cooperation with Spain and other countries, especially with fellow EU
members who now increasingly coordinate their efforts through such organiza-
tions as EUROPOL, may serve to further influence France’s political culture and
vice versa.  As countries increasingly face transnational threats, domestic and
foreign policies will necessarily blur.  Cooperation among states will be an
imperative for security, and values such as justice and civil liberties may collec-
tively be examined as each country must strike the right balance between secur-
ing it populations while maintaining freedoms.
CONCLUSION 
The importance of this case underscores the importance of analyzing ter-
rorism in a strategic and political context.  Spain was able to address the concerns
of the Basques politically through its inclusive democratization efforts.
Additionally, the regime built the foundations for a civic culture as described by
Diamond, Almond, and Verba.  As a result of  its legitimacy, Spain was able to
marginalize ETA and treat it more like a criminal organization than a wartime
adversary.  And with France’s cooperation, Spain effectively protected its socie-
ty.  France, also, bolstered its liberal democracy by more effectively protecting
its society through cooperation.  It also changed its views on justice concerning
terrorism.  We do not yet know what effects EUROPOL will have on Europe, but
the case of the Basques reveal some convergence of political cultures.
This case also sheds light on how policy makers and academics ought to
define and/or categorize terrorism.  Again, qualifying the term requires analysts
to view it in a political and strategic context.  At the heart of this context are the
concepts of political community, political culture, and legitimacy.  It is the fight
for legitimacy that characterizes terrorism in this case.  If we are to maintain our
liberal democratic regimes and way of life, it is imperative that we understand
how cooperation with other states influences the very soul of our democracy and
society.  Moreover, as we learn more about the transnational nature of terrorism,
it is evident that only inter-state cooperation will successfully face this challenge.
Peter Grier recently called Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network a “virtual coun-
try – the Republic of Jihadistan.”  He also cited a CIA report that describes the
latest trend in modern terrorism:  “the trend towards more diverse, free-wheeling
transnational terrorist networks [will lead] to the formation of an international
terrorist coalition with diverse anti-Western objectives and access to Weapons of
Mass Destruction.”111
As the United States examines its national security structures, including
now a Homeland Defense Department, it is paramount to learn from our
European allies and not lose sight of what the terrorist targets – our legitimacy.
Liberal democracy is not just a normative concern, it is a security imperative in
today’s transnational security environment.
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